Une formalisation du Principe de Précaution est donnée ici : nous formalisons la connaissance scientifique relative à la plausibilité d'évènements dans l'espace des états, ainsi que les concepts d'évènements et d'actes scientifiquements non ambigus. Nous définissons un plannificateur non précautionneux comme maximisant une utilité espérée de Savage après avoir écarté les actes scientifiquement ambigus. Nous montrons que pour une classe étendue de préférences de l'agent représentatif dans cette économie, cette modalité de choix non précautionneuse est sous-optimale. Nous confrontons cette modélisation à des débats, nationaux ou internationaux, concernant le changement climatique, certains arbitrages à l'OMC, et la régulation en matière de sécurité des produits chimiques.
Introduction
The origins of the Precautionary Principle can be traced back to the German Vorsorgeprinzip introducing a distinction between human activity with \dan-gers" of catastrophic consequences (nuclear apocalypse was then high on the list) and which m ust be prevented at all costs (Gefahrenvorsorge) and human activity with potentially harmful consequences (Risikovorsorge), in which case preventive measures should be investigated and taken in case of su ciently high risk of su cient h a r m .
This principle implied a reversal of the burden of proof from the proponents of the hypothesis of a causal link between a particular activity and harmful e ects, to the promoters of the said activity (from the Cassandras to the Agamemnons as it were).
Some hold the extreme view that this reversal of the burden of proof must be taken to mean that before engaging in (or indeed maintaining) an economic activity, proof must be supplied of its harmlessness. At t h e l e v el of political decision making, such a view rests on an ill de ned set of possible acts (in the case of Climate Change, for instance, the decision not to invest in renewable energy sources is an act which does not correspond to an economic activity a s intended above) and is excessive in requesting a full reversal of the burden of proof. However, the (concept of) reversal of the burden of proof was clearly at the heart of that prevention principle through the relation between scienti c knowledge and investment.
The formulations evolved in the international arena through a series of conferences on the protection of the North Sea At Bremen (1984) it was concluded that \damage to the environment can be irreversible, or remediable only at a considerable cost and over long periods of time, and that, therefore, coastal states and the EEC must not wait for proof of harmful e ect for taking action." At the second conference in London (1987) , the term`precautionary approach' appeared as a decision approach that may require action to control inputs of the \most harmful substances (...) even before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scienti c evidence." By 1990 at the Hague, this same approach was referred to as the \Precautionary Principle."
Its main avatar appeared in the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, where a central topic was the potential causal link between the burning of fossil fuels and the \greenhouse e ect."
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration issued at that conference is a compromise between the Hague formulation of the precautionary principle and the US view that the lack of clear scienti c evidence for a causal relationship between human behaviour and the greenhouse e ect meant that taking expensive measures was not acceptable. As a result, there is no question of \principle," but of mere \approach," and the scope of the declaration is limited to damage which i s either \serious" or \irreversible" and the measures are to be \cost-e ective 2 ."
Partly because of the insistence on cost-e ectiveness of preventive measures and on the issue of irreversibility, the principle was given an interpretation, within a framework suited to the debate on Climate Change, by Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) , purely in terms of traditional cost-bene t analysis under risk, thereby a voiding reference to the Knightian distinction 3 between risk (where a single additive probability measure represents the likelihood of all relevant e v ents on the state space) and uncertainty -o r a m biguity, a s w e shall call it throughout-(in all other cases). Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) identify a \precautionary e ect," which, along with the \irreversibilibility e ect" of Arrow and Fischer (1974) and Henry (1974) , refers to a lower optimal level of investment (in activities that are harmful to the environment) when the decision maker anticipates a (partial) \resolution of uncertainty" concerning the costs and bene ts of the investment. 4 Both e ects concern optimal behaviour under risk in the Savage Expected Utility framework and both rely crucially on a dynamic framework and the resolution of uncertainty (i.e. the conditioning on realized events or the outcome of exogenous experiments). Although it is clear, on the one hand, that the notion of irreversibility is tied to the dynamic framework, when de ned as the contraction of the set of possible acts at a future period, precaution and the precautionary principle, on the other hand, can be given a formulation in a static framework without prejudging of its dynamic extensions.
Moreover, it appears that the crucial concept underlying the principle is not the \resolution of uncertainty" but \uncertainty" itself, clearly referred to in the historic formulations as a departure from \su cient scienti c knowledge" or \conclusive scienti c evidence" and therefore inconsistent with a representation of beliefs as a single additive probability measure on the relevant e v ents in the state space.
The precautionary principle is therefore tied to an assumption of epistemological indeterminacy, especially in Timothy O'Riordan's de nition (in O'Riordan and Jordan (1995) for example) which w e adopt here as a reference: \the principle of precaution in environmental management implies committing human activity t o i n vestments where the bene ts of action cannot, at the time of expenditure, be justi ed by conclusive scienti c evidence."
The notions of \cost-e ectiveness" (Rio Declaration) and \justi ed expenditure" (O'Riordan De nition) can be taken to mean optimal in a Savage Expected Maximization framework, and we therefore formalize epistemological indeterminacy (situation in which \expenditure cannot be justi ed") as the lack o f a c l a s s are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack o f f u l l s c i e n ti c certainty shall not be used a reason for postponing cost-e ective measures to prevent e n vironmental degradation." 3 A similar distinction appears in Knight (1921) and Keynes (1921) . 4 There may be a countervailing \wealth e ect" due to the possibility of making more accurate decisions on the basis of better information. This e ect was rst recognized by Epstein (1980) , and is evaluated with respect to the precautionary and irreversibility e ects in Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) . On the relative magnitude of these e ects, see Chichilnisky and Heal (1993) and Ulph and Ulph (1997) . On irreversibility in the dynamics of investment, see also Pindyck (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . Godard (2001) discusses the relationship between the Precautionary Principle and the results in Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) .
of relevant e v ents on the state space, together with a single additive probability measure on those events, which accurately summarize scienti c knowledge 5 .
We place ourselves in the Savage decision framework where is the state space, or set of elementary events, H is the space of consequences, and is a family of possible actions (Savage acts) which map into H. W e are considering a social planner, with set of possible acts , who is maximizing the utility o f a representative agent with preference relation over acts denoted by , a n d w e suppose that utility of outcomes and beliefs on the likelihood of events (subsets of ) are biseparable in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) (so that, in particular preferences are state independent). Outcome sensitivity is represented by a utility function on H and beliefs over the likelihood of events are
represented by a set function on events. Savage expected utility p r o vides such a separation, in which is fully represented by the expectation of the utility o f acts taken with respect to a single subjective probability measure over events. Such a separation is a crucial assumption since we i d e n tify the agent's beliefs over the likelihood of events with the social planner's, the latter being derived from \scienti c knowledge." Whether this implies perfect extraction of subjective beliefs of agents by the planner, or that agents are perfectly informed of objective scienti c knowledge, or a combination of both, is irrelevant in the formalization of the decision making principle we attempt. However, in the context of environmental preservation, the objective i n terpretation is the more attractive one. One may think, say, of the conclusions of the IPCC 2001 Report 6 as summarized by the knowledge of the relevant class of subsets of (\scienti cally determined events") and of a set function operating on this class. Because most of the physical models used in the report's predictions are deterministic and the uncertainty i s i n troduced through di erent calibrations of relevant parameters, there is no reason to assume that the ranges of likelihood between upper and lower probabilities are degenerate, i.e. that beliefs can be accurately described by an additive measure on events.
However, from the scienti c information suitably summarized by a non additive set function, one can de ne a subclass of events A on which the set function characterizing likelihood is indeed additive. This subclass will be called the class of scienti cally unambiguous events (which m a y b e e m p t y), and acts which operate only on unambiguous events (i.e. are measurable with respect to A) will be termed unambiguous acts. ua will denote the subfamily of unambiguous acts which h a ve a simple interpretation as the acts the consequences of which there is \su cient s c i e n ti c knowledge" to evaluate in a traditional cost-bene t analysis under risk: in other words, such that the restriction of to ua can be realistically represented by S a vage Expected Utility. We see now that the formulations of the Precautionary Principle in international arenas yield a natural formalization of non-precautionary decision making in this framework, namely maximization of expected utility on the set of acts which are scienti cally unambiguous according to our de nition. A simple formulation of the Precautionary Principle then becomes: \in all decision settings, non-precautionary decision making is sub optimal."
The rest of the paper is organized as follows the next section introduces the model of scienti c knowledge on the state space and the de nition of scienti cally unambiguous acts, and presents the main formalization of the Precautionary Principle as Theorem 1. Section 3 shows the equivalence between scienti cally unambiguous acts as de ned here and subjectively unambiguous acts as de ned by Epstein and Zhang (2001) in a large class of state-independent preference relations for the representative agents. Section 4 discusses the formalization in the context of controversies on the Principle. Section 5 concludes.
Precautionary Principle
We begin this section with an objective de nition of scienti c knowledge and its induced beliefs over the state space, general enough to avoid precluding a subjective i n terpretation of the latter. We model scienti c knowledge over the state space as a family of onto mappings from a standard Borel set Y ( 0 1] for instance), into . (1) and we call f the largest -algebra on which f is a probability measure, and nally we denote by P f the restriction of f to f . Therefore, for each f, w e de ne a probability space ( f P f ), and if we consider the measurable space ( F ), where F is the largest -algebra contained in \ f2F f , fP f f2 F g c a n b e i n terpreted as a set of priors on the scienti cally determined class of relevant e v ents. If F = f g, w e call the scienti c knowledge F irrelevant to the state space.
Finally, w e summarize the belief representation on with the de nition of F such that, for all A 2 P ( ),
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We immediately see that F is a non additive probability o n P( ) satisfying
Call F the restriction of F to F . By construction, F is the lower envelope 7
of the set of priors fP f f2 F g , and therefore fP f f2 F g Core( F ), where the core of the non additive probability F , denoted Core( F ), is the set of probability m e a s u r e s o n ( F ) w h i c h dominate F setwise:
where M is the set of all countably additive probability measures on ( F ). In the special case mentioned above, where F is de ned as the family of measurable selections of a random correspondence F, F is actually the belief function 8 induced on by F as de ned in Dempster (1967) (i.e. for all A 2 P ( ), F (A) = (F ;1 (A))). In addition, as shown by Castaldo and Marinacci (2001) , when i s a P olish space (complete, separable and metrizable topological space), and F is compact valued, the core of F is equal to the weak -closed convex hull of fP f f2 F g .
To formalize the idea of epistemological indeterminacy as a departure from a single additive probability o n r e l e v ant e v ents, we call \scienti cally unambiguous" all the events on which F and all the measures in fP f f2 F g coincide 9 .
We call A the class of scienti cally unambiguous events and we observe t h e following properties of A, p r o ved in Amarante (2001): Lemma 1: A is a -system (i.e. stable with respect to complementation and countable disjoint union), it contains all the F -null events, and for all A 2 A , F (A c ) = 1 ; F (A).
An immediate corollary of Lemma 1 is that all measures in the Core also coincide on A.
It is important to note that A is not necessary closed with respect to nite intersections. To illustrate the de nitions above, consider a state space with four states of nature = fC B G Wg, where elementary states C, G, B and W stand for Catastrophic, Good, Bad and Windfall respectively. Consider scienti c knowledge over states as described by F = ff gg on Y = 0 1], 7 The fact that the set function representing beliefs is a lower probability b y construction does not constitute a restriction from a subjective point of view, as shown in Ja ray a n d Philippe (2001) . The restriction to lower envelopes, on the other hand, can be improved upon, in particular by considering events outside F . 8 An objective i n terpretation of belief functions is sketched in Henry (2001) . Note that here, \belief function" is a well de ned object and should not be confused with \beliefs" used above as a general term for the agent's representation of the likelihood of events in the state space.
9 This is by no means a new de nition (see Epstein and Zhang (2001) and references therein). It is the most natural de nition of unambiguous events in our objective framework. This is a summary of the interval-valued probability statements of the form \the probability of windfall gains ranges between one and ve percent." Notice that, in this setting, f = g = F = P( ), and the set of scienti cally unambiguous events, A = f fC Bg fB Gg fG Wg fC Wgg is not closed with respect to nite intersection (fC Bg \ f B Gg = fBg is ambiguous) 10 .
Returning to the general setting, we de ne the set of scienti cally unambiguous acts, denoted ua , as the set of acts which are measurable with respect to A, i.e. ua = f 2 ;1 (X) 2 A all X 2 P (H)g:
They are the acts which operate only on unambiguous events. In terms of the historic formulations of he Precautionary Principle, they are the investments which can be \justi ed by conclusive s c i e n ti c evidence."
In the example above, consider two a c t s I and T, s o t h a t = fI Tg, de ned by the following table of outcomes (or pay-o s):
We see that ua = fTg because I, w h i c h w e call \investment without insurance," is an ambiguous act, as I ;1 (f;10g) = fBg, s a y, i s a n a m biguous event whereas T, or \trading of uncertainty on the basis of the minimum belief in the windfall outcome and the maximumplausibility of the catastrophic outcome," is an unambiguous act, because T ;1 (f;20g) = fC Bg and T ;1 (f;11g) = fG Wg are both unambiguous events.
In such a simpli ed portfolio example, it would seem that of the two possible acts, the one that is intuitively \precautionary" in the sense that it hedges uncertainty, is also -and naturally so-the unambiguous act: indeed naturally so, since we h a ve constructed our T act in order to remove K n i g h tian uncertainty (assuming arbitrarily that it was feasible). So it appears that the decision maker is confronted with a static portfolio choice with two a vailable acts, a scienti cally ambiguous investment, the \intuitively non-precautionary" act, and a scienti cally unambiguous investment with hedged Knightian uncertainty, t h e intuitively \Precautionary" act.
It should be noted at this point, however, that we h a ve not considered investment in a riskless asset or any kind of baseline act relative t o w h i c h o t h e r acts would be considered. Now social planning does not occur in a void, and can be more easily apprehended in a static framework, with reference to a baseline act which can be rationalized as the path of least political e ort, and which w e will call \business as usual."
Consider the example of a local authority confronted with uncertain scienti c information on the health hazards of a construction material in a school building. The baseline act, in the absence of opinion pressure mechanisms creating opposite incentives, would naturally be to disregard the information and avoid spending public money with uncertain rewards. In the case of the di usion of genetically modi ed crops, the baseline act from the point o f v i e w o f t h e s o c i a l planner is naturally to avoid interfering through restrictive regulation in the agricultural development process. If introducing a genetically modi ed strand of a crop unambiguously increases yield, the decision to halt through regulations it is considered as an alternative t o n o n i n tervention, with unambiguous costs and ambiguous rewards.
The case of Climate Change can be apprehended in a similar way, a n d w e shall consider a stylized representation of the problem. The state of the industry and the state of the technology are paramount in the identi cation of the baseline act. If we consider the regulation of electricity production with respect to carbon dioxide (hereafter CO 2 ) emissions in a country which produces all its electricity in coal plants, the state of the industry is then de ned by all-coal generation of electricity. Suppose further that the state of the technology is de ned by the availability of an alternative generation method using natural gas and producing less CO 2 emissions. Finally, C O 2 free generation methods are considered, but more costly research is needed to develop them and to nd out whether or not they are economically viable. So the acts available to the planner are the following: The social planner may k eep producing energy with coal plants (act B for \business as usual"), shift all generation to gas which produces less CO 2 emissions (act Gas) a t a c o s t C g , o r c o m bine either of the previous acts with R&D into an alternative energy generating technology that produces no CO 2 emissions at an extra cost C r (acts R for \Research" and RG for \Research and Gas"). Both the outcome of research i n to the alternative technology and the e ects of CO 2 emissions are supposed uncertain. Let the relevant e v ents be classi ed in the 
where D c and D g are the costs of potential damages caused by coal emissions and gas emissions respectively. Note that the acts are normalized with respect to the baseline act B, so that the costs of environmental degradation due to CO 2 emissions from coal plants appear as bene ts of CO 2 emissions reducing technologies.
So far, we h a ve not speci ed the va l u e s o f t h e p i j , s o t h a t w e can make n o statement about the ambiguous nature of the acts de ned in the table above. If all p j i 2 (0 1) are distinct, none of the three acts above i s u n a m biguous. Suppose now that p 2 f = p 2 g , b u t p 1 f < p 1 g . I n t h a t c a s e , fB Cg and fW G g are unambiguous events, so that Gas is an unambiguous act. However, fBg is an ambiguous event, so that both R and RG are ambiguous acts. In terms of the historical formulations of the Precautionary Principle, investing in research f o r the development o f C O 2 free electricity generation methods has a cost which \cannot be justi ed by conclusive scienti c evidence:" indeed, the expected utility o f R and RG cannot be evaluated.
There emerges therefore from this example a notion of \non-precautionary" social planner, as one who considers the set of acts as normalized with respect to a baseline act (in this case, maintaining coal powered generation) and who is prepared to engage in an alternative act if and only if its expected utility is positive. Such a social planner would therefore consider the expected utility We see, therefore, that under the condition above, for a social planner acting on behalf of a representative agent with Choquet Expected Utility preferences (de ned precisely in the next section), disregarding act RG leads to a suboptimal decision. This shows that the Precautionary Principle does not systematically lead to conservative action, contrary to a largely held belief 12 .
We n o w give our main de nition and state our formalization of the Precautionary Principle as Theorem 1.
De nition 1: Given scienti c knowledge F, a utility function on the space of consequences, and a set of acts , measurable with respect to F and normalized in such a w ay that and act 0 , called \Business as Usual" is a null act, a non precautionary social planner is a Savage Expected Utility Maximizer with set of acts restricted to ua .
We can now state the main theorem.
Theorem 1: If is a separable preference relation on acts in such that the restriction of to au is SEU, then non precautionary social planning is sub optimal.
It is easy to see that the \theorem" trivially follows from the contraction of the set of possible acts which, in the case of state independent preferences, unambiguously reduces welfare. As with the Coase Theorem for example, the problem is not in the proof but in the relevance of the assumptions, which will be examined in the next section.
Scienti cally and subjectively unambiguous events
To examine the scope of the validity of Theorem 1, we need to consider conditions on the representative a g e n t's preference relation under which the conditions of Theorem 1 are satis ed. To this end, we shall consider two axiomatizations of preferences, Choquet Expected Utility (hereafter CEU) and Multiple Priors (hereafter MEU), and use recent results in Epstein and Zhang (2001) and Amarante (2001) to show that they both satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1 under mild additional conditions. We shall then be able to summarize this section by the following claim: When the representative agent has CEU or MEU preferences compatible with scienti c knowledge F, then Theorem 1 applies, so that non-precautionary social planning is sub-optimal.
This rests essentially on the identi cation between scienti cally unambiguous events as de ned above, and subjectively unambiguous events from the point o f view of a CEU or a MEU preference relation as de ned in Epstein and Zhang (2001) . We shall therefore recall the general result of the Ellsberg experiments which s h o w that an agent presented with objectively ambiguous information on the state space does not in general transform this information into an additive probability measure, so that the notion of subjectively unambiguous events is relevant. We shall then recall the de nition of Epstein and Zhang (2001) , and give conditions under which the thus de ned subjectively unambiguous events coincide with scienti cally unambiguous events as de ned above. Corrolary 7.3 part c) of Epstein and Zhang (2001) and corrolary 13 of Amarante (2001) will then allow us to conclude that the conditions of Theorem 1 are satis ed.
Elsberg's experiments have s h o wn (in Ellsberg (1961) ) that when decision makers are presented with objectively ambiguous information about the state space, their preferences are not supported by a single additive subjective probability o ver events. The stylized experiment whose results support this claim is the following. The decision makers are presented with an urn in which t h e y are told there are 30 red balls and 60 either green or blue. This objective information is of ambiguous nature, so that the situation is one of epistemological indeterminacy as formalized above. The decision makers are asked to choose between acts 1 and 2 on the one hand, and between acts 3 and 4 on the other hand, where all four acts are simple bets de ned by the outcome table below. R B Green red is drawn blue is drawn green is drawn 1 bet on R 100 0 0 2 bet on B 0 100 0 3 bet on R or Green 100 0 100 4 bet on B or Green 0 100 100 Preferences uncovered in the experiment are the following: 1 is in most cases strictly preferred to 2 , w h i l e 4 is in most cases strictly preferred to 3 . S u c h preferences cannot be supported through expected utility m a x i m i zation by a single additive probability measure P over events in the state space, since that would imply P(R) > P (B) a n d P(R) + P(Green) < P (B) + P(Green) w h i c h are incompatible. Intuitively, these preferences can be explained by the fact that some events in the state space are considered as subjectively ambiguous, and that they are shunned by the decision maker. This yields a distinction between subjectively ambiguous events (such a s fR Bg in this case) and subjectively unambiguous events (such a s fB Greeng).
In the example of section 2, we m a y presume that the representative agent, informed of \scienti c knowledge" on the state space, would also consider fG Bg (\Good or Bad," not \Green or Blue"!) as subjectively unambiguous and fCg, say, as subjectively ambiguous.
Epstein and Zhang (2001) and the condition above is also satis ed when T is everywhere replaced by T c . 13 To i n vestigate the relation between objectively and subjectively unambiguous events, we need to consider separable preference relations which generalize Savage Expected Utility in the sense that beliefs over the likelihood of events in the state space are represented by F.
Two main axiomatizations of preferences exist in the literature which satisfy these criteria: Choquet Expected Utility (hereafter CEU) in Schmeidler (1989) and Maxmin Expected Utility (hereafter -MEU) generalized from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) .
We call a preference relation a CEU ordering if there exist a utility function u : H ! IR and a monotone set function on a measurable space ( ), a -algebra of subsets of , such t h a t ( ) = 1 and ( ) = 0 and can be represented by the functional V : ! IR de ned by
where the integral is taken in the sense of Choquet. Axiomatizations of such preferences in the Savage domain are given in Gilboa (1987) and Wakker (1989) among others.
We call a preference relation an -MEU ordering, if there exists a utility function u and a unique nonempty, w eak -compact and convex set C of countably additive probabilities on ( ) as above, such t h a t can be represented by the functional
for 2 0 1]. An axiomatization of such preferences in the Savage domain is given in Casadesus-Masanell, Klibano , and Ozdenoren (2000) (for = 1). The two models coincide in case the non additive probability i s a c o n vex capacity (i.e. (A B) + (A\B) (A) + (B) for all A and B in ). In that case, the CEU preference is identical to an -MEU with = 1 a n d C = C o r e ( ).
The multiple prior principle is often criticized when applied to collective decision on the grounds that it evaluates acts according to the \worst case scenario," thus emulating the proponents of a total reversal of the burden of proof. It is clear, rst of all, that this criticism can only apply to the -MEU with = 1 (or the special case of CEU with a convex capacity), and, second, that in our setting, inasmuch as beliefs and outcome sensitivity are separable, and as beliefs are perfectly extracted and objectively represented by F, considerations of ambiguity a version are irrelevant to the general formulation of the Precautionary Principle given above.
In both cases described above, we show that the set A of scienti cally unambiguous events coincides with the set A 0 of EZ-subjectively unambiguous events, and that preferences are SEU on A, so that Theorem 1 applies. 
(ii) F is continuous from above o n A 0 , i.e. for all decreasing sequence (A i ) of subjectively unambiguous events, 
13 Then the set of scienti cally unambiguous events coincides with the set of EZsubjectively unambiguous events, and is SEU on ua (so the Theorem 1 applies).
If is monotone continuous and -MEU with C = fP f f2 F g , t h e n t h e conclusions above still hold.
Proof of Theorem 2: First of all, recall that, by construction, F is the lower envelope of a non empty set of additive probability m e a s u r e s o n F . So, as a Choquet capacity, F is continuous from below along all sets in F . Moreover, a s a l o wer probability, it satis es
where F is the conjugate upper probability. F rom 10, it is easy to see that
The conditions of Corrolary 7.3 part c) of Epstein and Zhang (2001) are satised, which p r o ves the CEU part of the result above. In the -MEU case, the result follows from Corrolary 13 of Amarante (2001) . Note that the assumptions implicitly impose convexity a n d w eak -compacity o f fP f f2 F g .
Applications of the precautionary principle
In this section, we w ant t o i n vestigate the nature of scienti c knowledge, represented in the model by functions in F, in actual cases where the Precautionary Principle is invoked. We will see that the functions f in these cases are sciencebased, in a sense that is not in general the traditional one, but is nevertheless logical and supported by facts. We shall rst consider the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) approach of the perspectives of climate change. The expected e ects of climate change are warmer temperatures, a more intense and chaotic hydrological cycle, rising sea levels, and possible \sur-prises" like a w eakening of thermohaline circulation (e.g. a weakening of heat carrying to Europe by the Gulf Stream). In order to estimate these e ects, the IPCC used six greenhouse gases emissions scenarios in various climate models. The results, as presented in the third IPCC report (2001) , are that Carbon dioxides concentrations in 2100 would range between 540 and 970 ppm, i.e. between 1.5 and 2.7 times the present l e v el. Global average temperatures over the 1990 to 2100 period would increase by 1.4 o C to 5.8 o C. Global average sea level would rise by 0.09 to 0.88 meters over this century.
These changes would be larger than anything experienced in the past 10 000 years, and would be even larger locally (where exactly is still too uncertain to be mapped). Why s u c h ranges? Because of the uncertainty associated with such critical parameters as: Greenhouse gas emissions (that, for example, have been larger than expected between 1990 and 2000). Impacts of clouds and aerosols (paradoxically, the current emissions of S0 2 and N0 x are to be regretted in this respect, as the concentrations of these gases in the atmosphere tend to reduce warming). Feedback e ects from oceans (as regards both temperatures and storage of CO 2 ). Natural climate variability. No probability measure can be put on the magnitudes of these phenomena, hence on the ranges of the e ects previously mentioned. It is thus clear that the science of climate change is ambiguous. But the ambiguity is rmly kept within bounds, that may be seen as bounds on the F-set of scienti c knowledge. These bounds are not provided by the canonical form of scienti c investigation as conducted in controlled laboratory conditions, but they are nevertheless the result of a highly methodical, systematic, and systematically scrutinized production process, that leaves no room for maverick prophecies. Indeed, the IPCC, as an international and intergovernmental group of experts, established by the United Nations and the World Meteorological Organization, is in charge of collecting relevant scienti c data, and of having them produced when they are lacking. The group uses these data and its members' scienti c expertise (in physics, chemistry, biology, economics, etc.) to asses the physico-chemical, ecological, and socio-economic consequences of climate change. The experts in the group are chosen by their scienti c peers, and the choice is con rmed by their respective g o vernments. Their work is organized as a continuous process, in subgroups gathered by e l d o f i n vestigation. They produce interim reports that are discussed with governments and NGOs. But they retain sole responsibility for the contents of their periodic o cial reports (1990, 1995, 2001) . By contrast, the executive summary of each o cial report is examined line by line with representatives of governments. All this shows that the IPCC process contributes to the F-set of scienti c knowledge in a systematically organized, controlled and rigorous way. It is all the more remarkable that the US government rejects this contribution as scienti cally unfounded.
We shall now more brie y consider the beef meat con ict between the USA and the EU before the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the ways the investigation processes in the possible dangers of chemical products accept or reject the precautionary principle.
The decision by the EU to block the imports of American beef -because, in raising beef, American farmers use various hormones that are forbidden in Europe -has been challenged before the WTO as a trade impediment d e v oid of scienti c justi cation. 14 The case has been decided according to the rules of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPM). These rules are traditional in terms of what constitutes an acceptable proof of a sanitary danger (laboratory experiments according to standard protocols, epidemiological studies, bias towards avoiding Type I errors, i.e. accepting the existence of a danger when there is none, rather than Type II errors, i.e. rejecting the existence of a danger when there is one, etc.). The European representatives were unable to meet such requirements and their reference to the Precautionary Principle was rejected accordingly, they lost the case.
However, it is interesting to observe in the minutes of the case, as did Noiville (2000) , that the WTO Appellate Body in charge didn't rigidly adhere to the SPM spirit, and hinted that the actual cause of the rebuttal of the European defence was not a rejection of the Precautionary Principle per se, but of the insucient and poorly organized evidence provided, that didn't permit to legitimately invoke the Precautionary Principle. Indeed the European defence concentrated on rather doubtful carcinogen e ects and ignored more compelling factors, like immunological and neurobiological ones, favouring obesity for example.
As far as chemical products sold on the American market are concerned, their dealing with respect to the precautionary principle is contradictory, b o t h i n regulatory and judicial arenas. As recollected by Cranor (1999) , \the regulation on carcinogens, for example, is in large part by means of post-market regulatory laws ...]. In a few cases, premarket regulatory statutes also address carcinogens (aspects of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act-notably the Delaney clause -the Toxic Substance Control Act, and aspects of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act). Where the regulation of toxic substances is by m e a n s of post-market regulatory statutes, standards of proof reinforce the scienti c burdens" put on the victims 15 .
The rulings of Courts are no less contrasted in their interpretation of what constitutes a scienti c proof and what is the relevance of the precautionary principle. For example, while the Washington DC Circuit ruled, as early as 1976, that \The statutes -and common sense -demand regulatory action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than certain that the harm is otherwise inevitable ...] awaiting certainty will often allow for only reactive, not preventive, regulation" (Ethyl Corp. v. EPA), the Supreme Court, in 1993, ruled that \In order to qualify as`scienti c knowledge', an inference or assertion must be derived by a scienti c method. Proposed expert testimony m ust be supported by appropriate validation -i.e., good grounds based on what is known" (Daubert 14 On EC measures concerning meat and meat products (hormones), see Maruyama (1998) and Wilson and Gascoine (2001) . 15 For a detailed list of \post-market" (i.e. the product goes to the market without any legal requirement of testing its dangerousness after the manifestation of a danger or the realization of a damage, proof must be delivered according to traditional scienti c criteria) and \pre-market" (i.e. the product must be tested before going to the market) regulations, see Congress (1987 16 .
The 1993 judgement w as con rmed and reinforced in 1997 by General Electric v. Joiner. Obviously, what constitutes scienti c proof, in cases where public health issues are at stake, needs clari cation, all the more as \toxicology is not an exact science and there can be disagreements over data interpretation among toxicologists" in the words of one of them 17 . The Precautionary Principle, properly formulated and rigorously implemented, may p r o vide such clari cation, as suggested from a medical point o f v i e w b y Graham (2001): \Waiting for scienti c certainty of harm prior to taking protective action is a prescription for new epidemics as well as continued declines in public trust in government, industry and technology".
Conclusion
The precautionary principle is about the nature of scienti c deduction and inference which is appropriate in choices under Knightian uncertainty (or ambiguity). It is not about \cost-e ective" choices, that are anyway required by t h e principle of Paretian e ciency. Nor is it about \cost-bene t analysis" or \pro-portionality", that are embedded in the optimal choice of an act in the set of possible acts with respect to the preference ordering of the representative agent. Trivially, it is all the more necessary to correctly apply the precautionary principle as the issues at stake are more \serious" and more \irreversible". But irreversibility, o r V OI (Value of information) as the risk managers say (see Graham 2001) is a dynamic concept, that requires a dynamic version of our model. This is left for future research, as is the issue of who bears the burden of the proof, which is meaningless here and would require a game-theoretic setting.
6 Acknowledgements:
